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Introduction
This paper analyzes the role of country-, industry-and firm-specific determinants on the transfer pricing risk awareness of multinational enterprises (MNEs) around the world. The existing literature mainly focuses on the effects of tax differentials and tax competition on the transfer pricing behavior of MNEs (i.e., MNEs shift income from high tax countries to affiliates located in low tax countries). By way of contrast, we ask whether and to what extent common tax considerations (e.g., experience from previous tax audits) and transfer pricing specific determinants are associated with a higher number of MNEs reporting a high transfer pricing risk perception. Hence, our approach predominantly focuses on transfer pricing as a critical compliance issue rather than a means of tax optimization.
We implement a unique set of explanatory variables, in particular (i) variables accounting for general tax and transfer pricing specific strategies, (ii) the types and characteristics of intercompany transactions the MNEs are involved in, and (iii) the individual transfer pricing compliance efforts and resources dedicated to transfer pricing matters within the MNEs. Our dependent variable -the number of MNEs in a given country and industry that report transfer pricing to be the largest risk issue -is derived from a categorical survey variable varying from the "largest risk issue" over "a risk issue but not the largest" to "not a risk issue at all". Empirically, we rely on a unique crosssectional survey of more than 350 MNEs around the world performed by a Big 4 accounting firm, in which the person with ultimate responsibility for transfer pricing matters was interviewed (i.e., in most cases, the Chief Financial Officer or tax director). The reported transfer pricing risk awareness is a subjective, professional assessment of a key person in each firm. Together with information on the transfer pricing behavior of each MNE, we are able to provide new insights to the transfer pricing compliance practice of MNEs.
Our empirical findings suggest that the number of MNEs in a country and industry considering transfer pricing the largest risk issue is positively related to a lion's share of transfer pricing specific determinants, such as the materiality of intangible goods transactions and the compliance approach. Further, we observe that the set of variables used to account for common tax considerations, and in particular previous tax audit experience, do also significantly affect the perception of transfer pricing as a corporate risk issue. This, in turn, suggests that compliance considerations -apart from tax optimization strategies -should be accounted for not only in empirical work but also in theoretical transfer pricing models.
The paper is organized in the following way. In Section 2, we briefly review the related literature. Section 3 explains the technique for estimating the expected number of MNEs reporting a high transfer pricing risk awareness in an industry in a given country. It further summarizes the data and discusses the variables used in the empirical model. In Section 4, we present and discuss the empirical findings. Section 5 concludes.
Literature review
Previous research on transfer pricing can be broadly divided into two strands of literature: The first one is primarily concerned with optimal firm strategies given different tax rates, whereas the second one focuses on government response on transfer pricing and the corresponding welfare effects. Compared to optimal government policies that are usually analyzed theoretically, optimal firm strategies are frequently corroborated by empirical evidence. Kant (1990) , for example, derived a framework in which a model MNE underinvoices (overinvoices) its intrafirm exports (imports) responding to tax rate differentials. More recently, Haufler and Schjelderup (2000) analyzed optimal taxation of corporate profits and found that it would be optimal for each government to distort investment decisions of MNEs to reduce tax rates and limit the incentive for profit shifting. Likewise, Raimondos-Møller and Scharf (2002) showed that a non-cooperative equilibrium is characterized by above-optimal levels of effective tax rates if governments use transfer pricing rules strategically. However, the lion's share of publications has been devoted to optimal firm strategies and the question whether evidence could be found that support income shifting behavior from high tax to low tax countries as suggested by game theory (see Hines 1997 and Devereux 2007 for comprehensive surveys). Horst (1971) provided a simple model which has since been frequently used as a theoretical background in empirical studies. The response variables used in the existing literature are generally proxies of actual transfer prices, such as reported profits of an MNE in high and low tax countries (see, for example, Grubert and Mutti 1991) , tax liability as a fraction of sales or assets in a high tax country (see, for example, Harris, Morck and Slemrod 1993), or foreign direct investments (FDI) of MNEs in high and low tax countries (see, for example, Hines and Rice 1994) . All these authors found evidence that MNEs use transfer prices as a means of profit maximization. Likewise, studies on the location of FDI come to the conclusion that companies from high tax countries locate a sizable fraction of their foreign activity in tax havens. Clausing affiliate profit rates and foreign country tax rates -a common approachshe also investigates the effects of taxes on U.S. MNEs' real operations across countries.
One common characteristic of previous research is the use of publicly available data that allows for testing indirectly the importance of transfer pricing. 1 However, using aggregate data and disregarding micro-level control variables raises unavoidable problems. Most obviously, it is generally not possible to estimate the firm-specific factors that determine the transfer pricing behavior of individual MNEs (e.g., income underreporting, transfer pricing method selection, transfer pricing risk management). Given the fundamentally nontransparent nature of transfer pricing, more disaggregated data seems to be indispensable. Moreover, it is also ignored that, according to the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines (see OECD 1999), transfer prices cannot be set equal to the marginal cost of production, but must be set according to the functions performed, risks borne and assets employed by the transaction parties. 2 To the best of our knowledge, however, there are no reliable sources of information about transfer prices on a firm level and, most obviously, taxpayers are generally very reluctant to publish sensitive data about their transfer pricing behavior as tax authorities have become more aggressive and public skepticism about transfer pricing as a means of income tax manipulation is prevalent. 3 This paper contributes to the existing research on the transfer pricing behavior of MNEs in two ways: First and foremost, it provides new insights to the drivers of transfer pricing as a tax compliance issue looking at the risk sensitivity of different industries across a large number of developed countries. Thereby, the paper relies upon unique survey which contains in-depth data 1 There are only very few exceptions, such as Clausing (2003) and Bernard, Jensen and Schott (2006) that draw conclusions from actual intercompany prices. The latter state that "... existing empirical studies generally rely upon indirect evidence or responses in a narrowly defined industry" or geographic area. Due to data availability, a large share of the existing research geographically restricts the analysis of transfer pricing matters to North America. There are a few exceptions, such as Oyelere and Emmanuel (1998) , Huizinga and Laeven (2008) , and Egger, Eggert and Winner (2010) who focus on European data.
2 The OECD (1999) encourages all member countries to follow its transfer pricing guidelines in their domestic tax practices and taxpayers are encouraged to follow these guidelines in evaluating for tax purposes whether their transfer pricing complies with the arm's length principle. Since the first published version of 1995, a vast majority of all member states has incorporated into law the fundamental aspects of the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines.
3 The far-reaching international tax proposals unveiled by the Obama administration May 4, 2009 carry broad implications for MNEs, not only in the significant limits they would place on income deferral but in major changes to the foreign tax credit and new restrictions on the use of disregarded entities, practitioners told the Bureau of National Affairs. More specifically, the May 4 document reads that they will "eliminate loopholes for disappearing offshore subsidiaries and crack down on foreign tax havens". 3 Empirical framework and data
Econometric specification
Our aim is to estimate the main factors behind the perceived risk of transfer pricing as a compliance issue of MNEs. For this purpose, let us discuss the nature of our response variable in a first step, which is derived from a categorical variable restricted to three levels. The person with ultimate responsibility for transfer pricing in an MNE was asked to evaluate the following question:
To what extent do you consider transfer pricing a risk issue with regard to severe subsequent tax payments and penalties?
Respondents could choose from (i) the largest risk issue, (ii) a risk issue but not the largest, and (iii) not a risk issue. To preserve confidentiality, firm-level data was aggregated; i.e., records were summed for each country and industry combination in which MNEs operate; overall, twelve industry classifications were incorporated. Hence, the observational unit of our study is the country and industry dimension. For the purpose of this analysis and to limit the loss of valuable information, the dependent variable is defined as the number of MNEs in a specific country and industry that reported transfer pricing to be the largest risk issue in the aforementioned survey question.
Given the nature and distribution of the dependent variable, we use a count data model to estimate the relationship between the response variable and the set of explanatory variables. For variables with low expected counts (in absolute terms) as in our case, this is regularly more suitable than using a standard regression model. As we do not find strong evidence for overdispersion (see summary statistics in Table 2 and the test statistics reported in Table 3 ) and the Vuong test rejects the existence of zero inflation, we fit a non-inflated Poisson count data model. Hence, let the number of tax directors considering transfer pricing the largest risk issue within their group be represented by µ ij for each observed combination of country i and industry j which is generated under a Poisson regression model. Thereby, each observation, i.e., the MNEs in each country and industry, is allowed to have a different value of µ. Our basic specification reads as
with
y ij defines the outcome variable; x i is a column vector of country-specific explanatory variables; x ij is a vector of country-industry-specific regressors such as transfer pricing specific determinants obtained from the survey. β 1 and β 2 represent vectors of structural parameters.
In our specification, we include country-and industry-specific control variables that are mainly motivated by the existing literature on transfer pricing (also see Table 2 below and Table A .2 in the Appendix for summary statistics and the definition of all variables, respectively). As mentioned above, it is often believed that MNEs manipulate transfer prices such that income is taxed in low tax countries. 4 Therefore, we include the statutory corporate tax rate of the parent country. Further, we include additional information on the existence of country-specific statutory transfer pricing regulations along with penalty regimes and the time of introduction of domestic transfer pricing regulations. We will take these two factors into consideration as we believe that an MNE will most likely align its transfer pricing practice to the nature of domestic regulations and the behavior of domestic tax authorities. The remaining set of explanatory variables is derived from the survey of MNEs around the world (also see Section 3.2 for more information) and can be broadly divided into three sets of regressors. The first set controls for drivers of general tax considerations of MNEs. These strategic components are likely to provide general insights into a company's tax focus areas given its previous experience and future expectations. The second set concerns decisive information about the materiality and nature of intercompany transactions. More specifically, intangible transactions are relatively complex in terms of transfer pricing.
Therefore, traditional transfer pricing methods (i.e., the comparable uncon-4 There is no reliable source of firm-specific data on actual transfer prices and transfer pricing behavior such as the number of transfer pricing adjustments per year. The data and model specifications used in the existing literature on transfer pricing thus only allow for implicit conclusions on the link between income shifting behavior and transfer prices. Harris, Morck and Slemrod (1993) , for example, find that U.S. tax liability is related to the location of foreign subsidiaries suggesting that income is shifted by means of manipulation of transfer prices. Similar implicit conclusions are drawn by Grubert and Mutti (1991) and Huizinga and Laeven (2008) .
trolled price method, the resale price method and the cost plus method) can usually not be applied and tax authorities are particularly skeptical about whether and to what extent intangible transactions comply with the arm's length principle. The third set of independent variables controls for transfer pricing compliance practices and resource allocation.
Data and descriptive statistics
In total, more than 350 MNEs (parent companies) in 24 markets ( Note: Table 1 shows some basic descriptives of our data set. Reference is also made to Table A .1 in the Appendix which shows the twelve subordinate parent industries that were collapsed to five distinct industry classifications. 5 The difference between the mean and the variance of our dependent variable is also relatively low; the variance, 1.35, is just twice as large as the mean. The overall distribution of our dependent variable is not displaying signs of over-dispersion, that is, we do not observe a significantly greater variance than might be expected from a Poisson distribution (also see Figure A .1 in the Appendix). Furthermore, we also observe very large standard errors on the coefficients in the inflation equation which further implies a definite lack of fit in a zero-inflated model.
6 "Pioneer" countries are among the top ten countries worldwide introducing statutory transfer pricing regulations. Compared to all other countries, pioneer countries are believed to be relatively experienced in transfer pricing matters and their tax authorities are believed to follow a rather sophisticated approach in challenging a tax payer's transfer pricing system. 7 We defined low tax countries as countries with a corporate tax rate lower than the first quartile of tax rates of the full sample. High tax countries are defined analogously.
Estimation results on the determinants of transfer pricing risk awareness
This section connects the empirical findings of the existing literature to common transfer pricing practices of MNEs around the world using the aforementioned characteristics and determinants obtained from the Survey. Table 3 presents the empirical results of our count data model. Our dependent variable is defined as the number of MNEs in a given country and industry cell reporting transfer pricing as the largest risk issue. All three models include eleven industry dummies based on the parent industry classification. The first column presents the basic model specification which contains two countryspecific parameters as well as a set of transfer pricing specific determinants obtained from the Survey. It also includes the statutory corporate tax rate to account for larger tax compliance risks in high tax countries. In the second specification, we add two interaction effects between the share of MNEs with previous tax audit experience and (i) the statutory corporate tax rate and (ii) management responsibility for transfer pricing matters. This specification tests whether the impact of previous audit experiences depends on the tax levels and the management responsibilities in the respective country. The difference between columns two and three simply lies in the exclusion of all non-significant explanatory variables to obtain a parsimonious model (with a significance level of less than ten percent).
In all specifications, we report both the results of robust (see White 1980) and clustered standard errors. This allows us to investigate whether the level of aggregation gives rise to the presence of country-wise clustered errors, which are typically present in studies in which observations are randomly sampled but the explanatory variables are measured at a different aggregate level than the dependent variable. More specifically, our data may induce clustering of errors at the country level; that is, the aggregated firms in our industries are correlated in some unknown way within countries, but different countries do not have correlated errors. From Table 1 we know that the respondents/firms are not equally distributed across countries and industries. We accounted for this difference in representativeness such that we include the number of firms in a country and industry cell in our model. This ensures that our results and, hence, the coefficients of the explanatory variables are not driven solely by countries with a high number of observations (e.g., the United States).
In general, the model seems well specified. The control variables have the expected sign, the industry effects are significant, and the pseudo-R 2 is pricing issues as well as their expectation in the future. Hence, resources and compliance efforts will most likely be allocated to countries with high risk exposure, irrelevant of the corporate tax rate (i.e., tax minimization aspects are less important from a compliance perspective).
8 Several pseudo-R 2 for count models have been defined by analogy to the R 2 in the linear regression model. We only report McFadden's pseudo-R 2 (see, for example, Long 1997).
Regarding our variables of interest, we find evidence that most of the transfer pricing specific determinants derived from the Survey significantly affect the risk awareness of MNEs. First and foremost, we find that previous transfer pricing audit experience increases the number of MNEs perceiving transfer pricing as the largest risk issue. MNEs seem learn from their previous experience with competent authorities (and vice versa). 9 Relative to the other coefficients, this effect also proves to be among the strongest (also see Table 4 below for a discussion of marginal effects). We also observe that the share of MNEs with management responsibility for transfer pricing matters positively affects the transfer pricing risk awareness in a given country and industry.
The two interaction terms between the tax audit experience and the statutory corporate tax rate and management responsibility show negative coefficients.
That is, if the share of MNEs with previous tax audit experience increases, it has a strong positive effect on the number of firms in a country and industry perceiving transfer pricing as the largest risk issue, which is, however, reduced with an increasing number of firms with management responsibility for transfer pricing issues (or with an increasing statutory corporate tax rate). 10 With only one exception for the second interaction effect, however, the coefficients are insignificant.
Interestingly, the reliance on their auditor for transfer pricing advice negatively affects the transfer pricing risk sensitivity. This might have two explanations: First, a Channel 1 firm (i.e., an MNE that is both audited and provided tax advice by the same auditing company) will most likely not receive different opinions on the appropriateness of their internal pricing system from their audit team and their counterparts at the consulting arm of an auditor. Hence, if the same company audits a company's books that has provided advice in the management of transfer prices, the risk awareness is reported significantly lower. 11 Second, a Channel 2 firm (i.e., an MNE that is provided advice in other fields than transfer pricing by an auditing company, but not audited by this company) might be trusting in a long-term relationship with its auditor, who may have been providing audit related consulting services in the past.
It is also less surprising to see the significant positive effect of an increase in resources devoted to transfer pricing matters affect the risk awareness. This might indicate that the compliance efforts dedicated to transfer pricing matters in the past proved to be insufficient. Finally, Table 4 reports the corresponding marginal effects of the tax considerations and the other survey parameters for the three models presented in Table 3 . Except for the two variables controlling for previous tax audit experience and management responsibility the size of the marginal effects are relatively stable throughout the different model specifications. 12 For instance, Table 4 reports the marginal effect of a selection of relevant variables.
Marginal effects presented in the first (second) row are evaluated at the mean (median) of all other explanatory variables. A discrete change from 0 to 1 is assumed for dummy variables, which are indicated by a [D] . All variables are defined as in Table A. 2. "IC" stands for intercompany, and "T/N" is the abbreviation for transaction. *, **, and *** denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
taking the specification in column three, the marginal effect of previous tax audit experience evaluated at the mean of all other variables is around 0.339, and about 0.330 for a firm in a given country and industry with median transfer pricing characteristics -besides the existence of intangible property transactions the strongest effect. Accordingly, a change in the share of MNEs with previous tax audit experience of ten percentage points in a given country and industry is associated with an increase in the number of MNEs considering transfer pricing the largest risk issue by about 3.4 percent. Given the seemingly ever-increasing role of transfer pricing as a tax (compliance) issue, we believe that the share of MNEs that will have experienced a tax audit with focus on transfer pricing will also increase significantly over the next years.
Assuming that this share will increase to 75 (90) percent in the years ahead, while holding all other variables at their mean, the likelihood of at least one firm considering transfer pricing to be the largest risk issue in a given country and industry) increases by 9.6 (15.2) percentage points to 32.3 (37.8) percent.
In other words, we will then observe 0.133 (0.218) additional firms considering transfer pricing the largest risk issue.
Conclusions
The practitioners' world observes that the pace of yet another transfer pricing regulation has rapidly increased around the world and, likewise, has the nature of intercompany transactions and the transfer pricing systems become increasingly complex. It is well known from previous research that tax differentials offer an incentive for MNEs to underreport profits in high tax countries and overreport profits in low tax countries. The implications of these findings might be interesting not only from a tax policy perspective (e.g., harsher and more frequent transfer pricing audits would increase tax compliance), but also for theory building. To the best of our knowledge, there is no theoretical contribution on transfer pricing that explicitly accounts for the compliance risks of such activities. Linking the existing theory on transfer pricing closer to the (traditional) tax compli-ance literature might improve our understanding of profit shifting activities of MNEs substantially. 
